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I . Introduction 
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Do stock options provide an incentive for management to create value and improve 
corporate performance? The queslion remains unanswered. Campbell and 、/Vasley
(199ゆ） argue that stock option type incentive contracts were not particularly useful in the 
ca田 of Ralston Purina. Although Ralston Purina required roughly a 60% increase in 
stock prices over ten yea四 for the stock options to be exercised, this inc問ase in stock 
prices implied a required return on equity of about 7.7% which is lower than its cost of 
capital. In other words, litle is 田qui同d of management to fulfil the target stock price 
requirement imbedded in the executive stock option. On the other hand, Dial and 
Murphy (1995) find executive equity based compensation created value for the 
shareholders of General Dyna1mcs. In Japan, stock options were legalized in June 1997. 
The history is stil too short to tel whether stock options will be an impo同ant part of 
Japanese corporate culture. This paper examines whether synthetic stock options as 
oppmed to stock oplions are of value. In particular we focus on whether such market 
based incentives are cost effective using the framework developed in Meulbroek (2001) 
A large number of Japanese corporates now engage m the use of stock options. And 
an important practical issue revolving around stock options is how they should be valued 
and then recorded for accountrng purposes. FASB (US accounting standards) 
recommends the use of the Black-Scholes (BS) model. This has come under attack from 
many quarte四 The BS model does not take into account early exercise as it 1s a closed 
foロn solution for pricing European options Thus, at 日目t pass, we would think that the 
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BS model would 11nderval11e stock options and thus be recorded as an expense below its 
true value. But stock oplions involve other characteristics which a肥 notmodeled in the 
BS framework. For example, the stock option is not transferable and not tradable. In 
other words, if the executive leaves the company, he or she cannot take the stock option 
with them making the option less valuable. On a related note, the option cannot be 
hedged Also in times where there are shocks to pe四onal wealth, the executive will most 
likely exercise the option early. All of these cha回cteristics point towards early exercise 
and thus lead us to believe the BS model will overval11e the stock option. Carpenter 
(I 998) empincally investigates the issue of early exercise by comparmg a utility based 
valuation model incorporating risk aversion parameters to a modified binomial tree 
model to explam actual exercise of stock options for a sample of 40 corporate stock 
option plans in the U.S. The utility based model did not outperform the binomial t問e
model. 
Before stock options were legalized in Japan, companies expenmented with 
instruments referred to as synthetic stock opt旧ns. As Sony was pioneering in the use of 
this instrument, 1t 1s often called a Sony type synthetic stock option. The synthetic stock 
option is an interestmg case of financial innovalion and engineering in Japan. A 
印中orate such as Sony would issue a co中O回te bond tied to a warrant "' a “ sweetener.” 
A security house, in this case, Yamaichi Securities, would purchase the bond and 
waπant. As the warrant is detachable, the bond is then sold to investo目 and the waπant 
sold back to Sony. This warrant is then distributed to the executives This paper focuses 
on the cost ef日ciency of these wa汀ants or synthetic stock options. For our numerical 
case study, we choose to look at the synthetic stock options issued by Sony in the mid 
1990’s 
2. Warrant Valuation 
Meulbroek (2日日 I) takes the value of the stock option calculated using the Black-
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Scholes model (FASB benchmark) and compares it to a representative executive’s 
valuation of the stock option. If the executive’s wealth position is tied into the value of 
the firm, then their poロfolio is less diversified. An executive 問ceivinga large fraction of 
their compensatton of equity or stock options would thus find the』r fortunes tied to the 
market price of their company ’ s stock. From the executives perspective, this 
undiversified wealth position is not always desirable. As a consequence the executive 
would place les value on stock options. However, t is important to note that in order 
for the stock option to play an c町ective role as a market based incentive, the executive’s 
wealth should be closely aligned with the value of the firm. 
In equilibnum, risk adjusted excess returns on al assets are equal. It follows that the 
risk adjusted returns on the market and on the sha同s of stock held by an undiversified 
executive should be the same. 
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whe田， r,,, is the 問turn on the matket portfolio, rJ:,"' is the 問tum on Sony as 田quired by 
an undiversified executive, and a; for i=m, S tsthe volatility for the market return (11) 
and Sony stock return (SJ. Rearranging and subtracting the market return on Sony stock, 
rs0.,., gives us 
The return on the Sony warrant, Rs,,y, can be written as, 
(2) 
1 , , a'w aw aw σ：S＇~＋ r. …S ー
R 2 品 as' '" as aτ 
'" w 
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whe問 Wis the value of the warrant and τis the time to maturity. Note this is simply the 
fundamental valuation equation (partial d1印erenlial equation) for the Black-Scholes model. 
aw σ.S~ 
, as 
We know that the volalility for the Sony warrant can be expressed asσ岬＝ ---wー－
Hence, the risk adjusted 田turn on the warrant can be formulated as 
(3) 
1 , , a'w aw aw nσ：S＇.「τー＋ r• . S － ιw 
"'"' 'r 2 , 'S' "" as aτI 
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As before, the risk adjusted warrant return should equal the risk adjusted market 
return. After reaロヨnging this gives us, 
(4) 1 ，句 a'w "ｷ aw aw σ；S' --:-,.-+ [r，，，，ニ－＇－（r.-1, )]S 一一一一－ r,W =0 
2 dδ ー yσm ’ as aτJ 
Assummg the CAPM holds and substituting equation (I) into (4), we have, 
(5) 
1 , , a'w , aw aw σ；S'--,-+[r,-(r~聞 r,,. )]S一一一一－r,W = 0 
2 , as' ' ~＂＇ 品開v as aτ , 
Notice, this 1s equivalent in foロn to the fundamental valuation equation for a cal option 
on a (proportional) dividend paying stock. Instead of the Black-Scholes model, we use 
the Black Scholes based warrant pricing model [Lauterbach and Schultz (1990)[. 
ぃ（品五）［csexp( （ふい）＋与W)N州国p(-r1~）XN(d2)]
叫＝ ln([s ＋ ~w刈＋［けん＇＇＇＂＇）Jr ＋ σ， .Ji
σ， Jr一一一一一一「
d, =d， σ＇ .,Jr 
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where N isthe number of shore' outstnnding of the underlying stock, Mis the number of 
waロヨnts issued, y isthe number shores that con be purch田ed with each wnrrant, r1 is the 
riskfree rate, ond τis the time to matunty. W is the wnrrant pnce, S isthe underlying 
stock price, X is the strike pnce. N(.) is the cumulative normal distnbution function 
Dividends are assumed to be zero for the purpose of this paper. This will affect the 
absolute pncing of the warrants, however, we are only concerned with relative pricmg in 
this poper. Although, relotively sophisticated models exist to price worrants and stock 
options, practitioners are more likely to use simpler closed form models for accountmg 
purposes. We nssume the Black-Scholes model ts o good first order approximation. 
Given the warrant price' from the above equation we con evaluote the cost efficiency of 
the WOπont-type stock option ns 
W(S",r，σ伽，，， r1,X)
W(S，τ，σ品町， ＇1,X)
We wil refer to this ratio as the cost efficiency 回io
In order to obtain, W(S", T，σSMy•'1·X ） ，血e wor田nt price for the undiversified 
executive, we assume that S" = Sexp(-(rZ"' ＇＇＂＂＇）τ） ond make appropriate 
substitutions in the obnve warrant pricing model. To implement the obove warrant 
pricing model we require an estimate of the equity volotility (stock return volnt!lity), Os. 
This is done by using three different methods. The historical volot!lity, as.H.βp IS the 
somple standord deviation of daily returns over a time spon of one yeor 
エ（r，，叩ー乃2
σs脚＝ ,/ill1／ι-----y--
where r5，州， 1s the doily 配tum for day /, r ismeon 回turn over the sample (one year), 
ond K is the number of usnble observotions We assumed a 252 trading doy year to 
obtain an annual volotility e'timate 
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The second approach was to use a GARCH(l,l) model [Bollerslev (1986)] to 
estimate an in-sample standard deviation. Due to space limitations we will abstract from 
any discussion of the GARCH(l,l）出 it is a standard time senes model. Summarγof 
GARCH(l, 1) parameter estimates a田 available from the author upon request. Our third 
approach involves estimating an EGARCH(l,I) model [Nelson (1991)1 and obtaining an 
average in-sample volatility estimate The EGARCH(l ,I) model estimated in this paper is 
＝α ＋α r. ＋ σε Sony,l 0 I So1'y,I I I I 
Inσ；； = /30 + /31Inσ.~1 + /l,<I e,_ I .,/2Tir -/lみ，）
whe肥＜，－N(O,1 ). The m回n equation is assumed to take an AR(l) process. {J1 田日ects
the persistence in the volatility If -fJ3fJ2 <0, then a positive shock，烏＞0, would result in 
a decrease in volatility Thus, -{J3{J2 mtroduces an asymmetric effect of a shock on 
volatility. Although we do not explicitly assume the volatility 1s governed by a 
stochastic proc田s [Duan (1995), and Ma日hand Kuwahara (1992)J, the warrant is at-the 
money at the time of issue and thus the Black-Scholes model will hold as an 
approximation [Takezawa and Shi岡崎hi (1996)]. 
3. Data and Empmcal Results 
Table I: Su皿mary S個目s目白
Mean Std. Dev Mm Max Beta 
Sony -0 0459 1.9263 -5.9189 9.40口 3
TOP IX -0.0371 1.1330 -4.8233 4.9068 0.965 
Nikkei -0 0355 1.3776 -5.7627 6.0775 0.782 
Daily relums are calculated as log relative prices Sample is from October 1994 to Seplember 
1995 Mean 1s 山，e me田 daily re四m in percent. Sid Dev is 由巳 standard deviation of 血e d剖ly
re回ms not 哨ust吋 to an annual 四tc. This is the d副ly histoncal volatility estimate Min and 
Max are 山e mm1mum and maximum returns over the s百nple penod Beta IS e<timated by 
民E回ssingthe Sony stock re佃mon each index return. 
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The first synthetic stock option was issued in the Fall of 1995 to 36 Directors in 
Sony. Each warrant entitled the holder to purchase 2 millton yen worth of Sony’s 
common stocks at a strike of 5,330 yen. The life of the warrant spanned from October I, 
1995 to August 3 I,I 999. Daily returns for Sony stock and the TO PIX index are 
calculated as daily log relattve closing prices from October 1994 to September 1995. 
The beta for Sony is O'timated by running a regression of the daily Sony stock returns on 
each index return over the entire sample period. The beta against the TOPIX index ts 
estimated at 0 96 and 0.78 agamst the Nikkei mdex (Table I) As a riskfree rate we used 
3% which is approximately the JGB yield during this time frame. The market premtum 
1s assumed to be 5%. 
The historical volatility estimate (not annuahzed) is found in Table I along with the 
estimate of the beta. The GARCH and EGARCH models are 白tto the daily 同turn series 
for the same one year sample period. The EGARCH pa悶meterestimates are given Table 2. 
τ'able 2: EGARCH Conditional Variance Paramet町 Estimates
Sony TOP IX Ntkkei 
β。 -0.0019 -0.3052 -0.6日OD
(4.51) (2.06) (2.07) 
β1 0.9411 0.9634 0.922日
(0.32) (54.6日） (25.72) 
β2 -0.2286 0.7552 0.2142 
(1.29) (l.82) 。.06)
β3 0.4887 0.1435 0.3257 
(4.89) (l.81) (4.日8)
LB 6.59 4.27 0.09 
LBSQ 1.61 3.65 7日5
SKEW -0.09 0.09 0.41 
KURT 5.41 7.46 5.69 
LB is 由巳 Ljung-Box statistic for 由巳 standrudized residuals at lag one. LBSQ is 由eLjung-Box 
statistic for the squrued standrudized r田iduals at lag one. SKEW and KURT 釘e the skewness 
四dkurtos.s stat>SUcs of the slandrudtzed residuals t-stattStt回目m par叩theses
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The empirical evidence suggests that Sony executives did not value the warrants at a 
discount even when assummg they are completely und1versified. Using the historical 
volatility estimates our efficiency ratios were 98% and 99% for the TOPIX and Nikkei 
index 田spectively Similar results can be seen for the efficiency ratios calculated based 
on the GARCH and EGARCH volatility estimates This is due to the relatively narrow 
spread in reqmred returns for Sony stock by the executive and the market (investors). 
Table 3: Efficiency Ratio 
















τfie e『1ciencyratio is calculated using diffmr>t estimates of volatility for lwo different proxies 
for !he markel (slock index). Hislorical volatilily refers to use of !he hisloncal slmdard devialion 
for Sooy stock returns 皿d the index (market) relum. EGARCH refers to use of the in-sample 
volatility estimale for Sony stock returns and 印刷ex (market) return Warrant prices and 
efficiency ratios are th叩 obtainedunder each of !he 血圧erentvnlatilily sc叩叩OS
Notes 
ホ This 目searchwas partially funded by lhe Kokusai Kyoiku Zaidan (IUJ). 
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疑似ストックオプションに関する一考察
〈要約〉
竹津伸哉
近年、ストックオプションはコスト効率面において報酬制度として有効かど
うか議論されている。ソニーの疑似ストックオプションをケースとして取り上
げ、このコストの有効性の実証分析を行う。
